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dc.contributor.authorBester, Helmuten_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-02-14en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-09-25T13:28:01Z-
dc.date.available2009-09-25T13:28:01Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.isbn3938369205en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/28019-
dc.description.abstractThis paper views authority as the right to undertake decisions that impose externalities on other members of the organization. When only decision rights can be contractually assigned to one of the organization's stakeholders, the optimal assignment minimizes the resulting inefficiencies by giving control rights to the party with the highest stake in the organization's decisions. Under asymmetric information, the efficient allocation of authority depends on the communication of private information. In the case of multiple decision areas, divided control rights may enhance organizational efficiency unless there exist complementarities between different decisions.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherFreie Univ., Fachbereich Wirtschaftswiss. Berlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiskussionsbeiträge des Fachbereichs Wirtschaftswissenschaft der Freien Universität Berlin 2005/21en_US
dc.subject.jelD23en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelL22en_US
dc.subject.jelP14en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordAuthorityen_US
dc.subject.keywordDecision Rightsen_US
dc.subject.keywordExternalitiesen_US
dc.subject.keywordIncomplete Contractsen_US
dc.subject.keywordImperfect Informationen_US
dc.subject.keywordTheory of the Firmen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorie der Unternehmungen_US
dc.subject.stwUnvollständiger Vertragen_US
dc.subject.stwUnvollkommene Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwExterner Effekten_US
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen_US
dc.subject.stwEntscheidungen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleExternalities, communication and the allocation of decision rightsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn507401689en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:fubsbe:200521-
Appears in Collections:Diskussionsbeiträge, FB Wirtschaftswissenschaft, FU Berlin

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