Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/28014
Authors: 
Will, Birgit E.
Schmidtchen, Dieter
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
CSLE discussion paper series 2008-02
Abstract: 
This paper investigates the effectiveness of the new Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 which replaces the mandatory notification and authorization system by a legal exception system. Effectiveness is operationalized via the two subcriteria compliance to Art. 81 EC Treaty and the probabilities of type I and type II errors committed by the European Commission. We identify four different types of Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibria: fullcompliance, zero-compliance, positive-compliance and full-deterrence. We show that the Commission can, in principle, hit the full-compliance equilibrium, where the cartelizing firms fully obey the requirements of Art 81(3) EC Treaty and both error probabilities are zero.
Subjects: 
competition law
cartel law enforcement
legal exception
imperfect
JEL: 
K21
K42
L40
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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