|
EconStor >
Universität des Saarlandes (UdS) >
CSLE - Forschungsstelle zur Ökonomischen Analyse des Rechts, Universität des Saarlandes >
CSLE Discussion Paper Series, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics, Universität des Saarlandes >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/28014
|
| | |
| Title: | | Fighting cartels: some economics of council regulation (EC) 1/2003  |
| Authors: | | Will, Birgit E. Schmidtchen, Dieter |
| Issue Date: | | 2008 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CSLE discussion paper series 2008-02 |
| Abstract: | | This paper investigates the effectiveness of the new Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 which replaces the mandatory notification and authorization system by a legal exception system. Effectiveness is operationalized via the two subcriteria compliance to Art. 81 EC Treaty and the probabilities of type I and type II errors committed by the European Commission. We identify four different types of Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibria: fullcompliance, zero-compliance, positive-compliance and full-deterrence. We show that the Commission can, in principle, hit the full-compliance equilibrium, where the cartelizing firms fully obey the requirements of Art 81(3) EC Treaty and both error probabilities are zero. |
| Subjects: | | competition law cartel law enforcement legal exception imperfect |
| JEL: | | K21 K42 L40 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CSLE Discussion Paper Series, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics, Universität des Saarlandes
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/28014
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|