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dc.contributor.authorMonheim, Jennyen_US
dc.description.abstractGiven the background of changing institutional competencies in the European Union, we analyze the choice of asylum law standards of national and European parliaments, the Council of the European Union and codecision between the Council and the European Parliament. In a two country model we nd that the European arrangements maximize neither the welfare of the Member Countries nor the welfare of refugees. For the latter, there has been an improvement in the institutional location of asylum law making with the introduction of codecision. The current development towards a Common European Asylum System is in the interest of neither party.en_US
dc.publisherCSLE Saarbrückenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCSLE discussion paper series 2007-02en_US
dc.subject.keywordAsylum policyen_US
dc.subject.keywordIllegal immigrationen_US
dc.subject.keywordRegulatory competitionen_US
dc.subject.keywordPublic choiceen_US
dc.subject.keywordEU institutionsen_US
dc.titleStrategic asylum law making in Europe: institutional locusen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:CSLE Discussion Paper Series, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics, Universität des Saarlandes

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