Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/27850 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2007
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Frankfurt School - Working Paper Series No. 83
Verlag: 
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
Small and medium-sized firms often obtain capital via a mixture of relationship and arm's-length bank lending. We show that such heterogeneous multiple bank financing leads to a lower probability of ineefficient credit foreclosure than both monopoly relationship lending and homogeneous multiple bank financing. Yet, in order to reduce hold-up and coordination-failure risk, the relationship bank's fraction of total firm debt must not become too large. For firms with intermediate expected profits, the probability of ineefficient credit-renegotiation is shown to decrease along with the relationship bank's information precision. For firms with extremely high or extremely low expected returns, however, it increases.
Schlagwörter: 
Relationship lending
asymmetric information
financial distress
hold-up
coordination failure
JEL: 
D82
G21
L14
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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