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Title:Selection wages and discrimination PDF Logo
Authors:Schlicht, Ekkehart
Issue Date:2009
Series/Report no.:Economics / Discussion papers 2009-35
Abstract:Applicants for any given job are more or less suited to fill it, and the firm will select the best among them. Increasing the wage offer attracts more applicants and makes it possible to raise the hiring standard and improve the productivity of the staff. Wages that optimize on the trade-off between the wage level and the productivity of the workforce are known as selection wages. As men react more strongly to wage differ¬entials than females, the trade-off is more pronounced for men and a profitmaximizing firm will offer a higher wage for men than for women in equilibrium.
Subjects:Discrimination
selection wages
efficiency wages
hiring standards
monopsony
employment criteria
wage posting
Reder competition
JEL:J31
J7
B54
D13
D42
Creative Commons License:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/de/deed.en
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal - Discussion Papers

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