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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/27733
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| Title: | | Selection wages and discrimination  |
| Authors: | | Schlicht, Ekkehart |
| Issue Date: | | 2009 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Economics / Discussion papers 2009-35 |
| Abstract: | | Applicants for any given job are more or less suited to fill it, and the firm will select the best among them. Increasing the wage offer attracts more applicants and makes it possible to raise the hiring standard and improve the productivity of the staff. Wages that optimize on the trade-off between the wage level and the productivity of the workforce are known as selection wages. As men react more strongly to wage differ¬entials than females, the trade-off is more pronounced for men and a profitmaximizing firm will offer a higher wage for men than for women in equilibrium. |
| Subjects: | | Discrimination selection wages efficiency wages hiring standards monopsony employment criteria wage posting Reder competition |
| JEL: | | J31 J7 B54 D13 D42 |
| Creative Commons License: | |  |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal - Discussion Papers
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