Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/27591
Authors: 
Osterloh, Steffen
Heinemann, Friedrich
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers 08-108
Abstract: 
Setting minimum tax rates is a well discussed way of mitigating pressure from tax competition. This paper investigates which motives shape the support for a minimum corporate tax among politicians. We make use of a unique data base: a survey among members of the European parliament. Our results confirm that the politicians' ideology as well as individual characteristics such as educational background exert a major in uence. Moreover, several predictions regarding national interests are derived from various standard tax competition models. These hypotheses are partly supported by the data; in particular, different national preferences for social equality shape the support. A comparison with survey results from the German Bundestag reveals that German politicians on the national level do not show different preferences towards tax rate harmonization.
Subjects: 
company taxation
tax harmonization
political economy
European Parliament
JEL: 
H25
H87
D78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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