|
EconStor >
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW), Mannheim >
ZEW Discussion Papers >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/27581
|
| | |
| Title: | | Ex Post Regulation Facilitates Collusion  |
| Authors: | | Beschorner, Patrick Frank Ernst |
| Issue Date: | | 2008 |
| Series/Report no.: | | ZEW Discussion Papers 08-099 |
| Abstract: | | Under ex ante access regulation entrants often claim that access fees are excessive. I show that this is only the case if further entry is admitted. If the entrant is protected from further entry it would agree with the incumbent upon a strictly positive access fee which may exceed the efficient level. Ex post regulation facilitates this type of collusion and should be abandoned. |
| Subjects: | | entry deterrence access regulation network infrastructure vertical differentiation |
| JEL: | | K23 L42 K21 L51 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des ZEW ZEW Discussion Papers
|
| Files in This Item:
| |
| File |
Description |
Size | Format |
| dp08099.pdf | | 161.99 kB | Adobe PDF |
|
| No. of Downloads:
| |
| last Month |
last 3 Month |
total |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/27581
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|