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Title:Ex Post Regulation Facilitates Collusion PDF Logo
Authors:Beschorner, Patrick Frank Ernst
Issue Date:2008
Series/Report no.:ZEW Discussion Papers 08-099
Abstract:Under ex ante access regulation entrants often claim that access fees are excessive. I show that this is only the case if further entry is admitted. If the entrant is protected from further entry it would agree with the incumbent upon a strictly positive access fee which may exceed the efficient level. Ex post regulation facilitates this type of collusion and should be abandoned.
Subjects:entry deterrence
access regulation
network infrastructure
vertical differentiation
JEL:K23
L42
K21
L51
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des ZEW
ZEW Discussion Papers

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