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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/27580
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| Title: | | Do Shorter Product Cycles Induce Patent Thickets?  |
| Authors: | | Beschorner, Patrick Frank Ernst |
| Issue Date: | | 2008 |
| Series/Report no.: | | ZEW Discussion Papers 08-098 |
| Abstract: | | The traditional argument that shorter product cycles favor trade secret over patenting is reviewed. A game theoretic model provides an argument that shorter product cycles can induce firms to file more patent applications. The firms may be trapped in a prisoners' dilemma where all firms would jointly prefer to patent less and to not have a patent thicket. If firms start applying for patents on technologies which are not yet mature in order to cover ideas that may eventually turn successful, this may create a patent thicket. The transition into a situation where firms start patenting many ideas instead of single mature technologies is initiated and accelerated when network effects are present or patents exhibit a blocking property. |
| Subjects: | | patent thicket product cycles licensing network effects |
| JEL: | | L1 L2 O31 K2 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des ZEW ZEW Discussion Papers
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