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dc.contributor.authorBraun, Sebastianen_US
dc.contributor.authorDwenger, Nadjaen_US
dc.contributor.authorKübler, Dorotheaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-01-30en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-06T13:19:37Z-
dc.date.available2009-08-06T13:19:37Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/27283-
dc.description.abstractWe investigate the matching algorithm used by the German central clearinghouse for university admissions (ZVS) in medicine and related subjects. This mechanism consists of three procedures based on final grades from school (Abiturbestenverfahren, Auswahlverfahren der Hochschulen) and on waiting time (Wartezeitverfahren). While these procedures differ in the criteria applied for admission they all make use of priority matching. In priority matching schemes, it is not a dominant strategy for students to submit their true preferences. Thus, strategic behaviour is expected. Using the full data set of applicants, we are able to detect some amount of strategic behaviour which can lead to inefficient matching. Alternative ways to organize the market are briefly discussed.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherDeutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion papers // German Institute for Economic Research 759en_US
dc.subject.jelC78en_US
dc.subject.jelD02en_US
dc.subject.jelD78en_US
dc.subject.jelI29en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordMatchingen_US
dc.subject.keyworduniversity admissionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordstrategic behaviouren_US
dc.subject.stwStudienfachen_US
dc.subject.stwBerufswahlen_US
dc.subject.stwZentrale Organisationen_US
dc.subject.stwMatchingen_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwDeutschlanden_US
dc.titleTelling the truth may not pay off: an empirical study of centralised university admissions in Germanyen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn55754937Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
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DIW-Diskussionspapiere

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