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dc.contributor.authorKorn, Evelynen_US
dc.contributor.authorLengsfeld, Stephanen_US
dc.date.accessioned2007-11-20en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-06T13:11:09Z-
dc.date.available2009-08-06T13:11:09Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/27188-
dc.description.abstractNumerous (high-tax) countries presume that multinational firms use their transferpricing policies to shift profits into countries with lower tax rates. To avoid the corresponding loss in tax revenues, tax authorities develop constantly tightening rules to curb transfer-price distortions. Affected firms include the decision of compliance to these rules into their strategic considerations. In a scenario with arm'slength regulation in two countries, we analyze the transfer-pricing policy of a firm that uses the same transfer price for tax and managerial incentive purposes. Thus, the transfer-pricing policy is driven by three issues: interaction with competitors, minimization of tax burden, and avoidance of punishments. The model shows that tighter transfer-pricing rules may help firms to mitigate competition and to increase their profits and that non-compliance to the arm's-length principle is part of their equilibrium strategy.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherFachbereich Wirtschaftswiss., Univ. Hannoveren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion papers // School of Economics and Management of the Hanover Leibniz University 378en_US
dc.subject.jelH25en_US
dc.subject.jelL22en_US
dc.subject.jelM40en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwTransferpreisen_US
dc.subject.stwMultinationales Unternehmenen_US
dc.subject.stwSteuerplanungen_US
dc.subject.stwAnreizvertragen_US
dc.subject.stwDuopolen_US
dc.subject.stwZwei-Länder-Modellen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleDuopolistic competition, taxes, and the arm's-length principleen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn54984693Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
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