Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/27178
Authors: 
Matzke, Christina
Wirth, Benedikt
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Bonn econ discussion papers 2008,10
Abstract: 
In our model, individual consumers follow simple behavioral decision rules based on imitation and habit as suggested in consumer research, social learning, and related fields. Demand can be viewed as the outcome of a population game whose revision protocol is determined by the consumers' behavioral rules. The consumer dynamics are then analyzed in order to explore the demand side and first implications for a strategic supply side.
Subjects: 
bounded rationality
social learning
population game
mean dynamic
JEL: 
C61
C62
C79
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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