Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/27174
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dc.contributor.authorKoch, Lars P.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-12-10en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-06T12:41:03Z-
dc.date.available2009-08-06T12:41:03Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/27174-
dc.description.abstractWe show that a set of outcomes outside the convex hull of Nash equilibria can be asymptotically stable with respect to convex monotonic evolutionary dynamics. Boundedly rational agents receive signals and condition the choice of strategies on the signals. A set of conditional strategies is asymptotically stable only if it represents a strict (correlated-)equilibrium set. There are correlated equilibria that cannot be represented by an asymptotically stable signal contingent strategy. For generic games it is shown that if signals are endogenous but no player has an incentive to manipulate the signal generating process and if the signal contingent strategy is asymptotically stable, then and only then, the outcome must be a strict Nash equilibrium.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aGraduate School of Economics|cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn econ discussion papers|x2008,14en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelD80en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordDynamic Stabilityen_US
dc.subject.keywordNoncooperative Gamesen_US
dc.subject.keywordCorrelated Equilibriumen_US
dc.subject.keywordEvolutionen_US
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwSignallingen_US
dc.subject.stwNash-Gleichgewichten_US
dc.subject.stwDynamisches Gleichgewichten_US
dc.subject.stwEvolutionsökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwBeschränkte Rationalitäten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleEvolution and correlated equilibriumen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn587686634en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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