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Title:Evolution and correlated equilibrium PDF Logo
Authors:Koch, Lars P.
Issue Date:2008
Series/Report no.:Bonn econ discussion papers 2008,14
Abstract:We show that a set of outcomes outside the convex hull of Nash equilibria can be asymptotically stable with respect to convex monotonic evolutionary dynamics. Boundedly rational agents receive signals and condition the choice of strategies on the signals. A set of conditional strategies is asymptotically stable only if it represents a strict (correlated-)equilibrium set. There are correlated equilibria that cannot be represented by an asymptotically stable signal contingent strategy. For generic games it is shown that if signals are endogenous but no player has an incentive to manipulate the signal generating process and if the signal contingent strategy is asymptotically stable, then and only then, the outcome must be a strict Nash equilibrium.
Subjects:Dynamic Stability
Noncooperative Games
Correlated Equilibrium
Evolution
JEL:C72
D80
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn

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