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Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn >
Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn >
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/27167
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Budde, Jörg | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Kräkel, Matthias | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2008-12-10 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-08-06T12:40:57Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2009-08-06T12:40:57Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2008 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/27167 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | Several empirical findings have challenged the traditional view on the trade-off between risk and incentives. By combining risk aversion and limited liability in a standard principal-agent model the empirical puzzle ont hepositive relationship between risk and incentives can be explained. Increasing risk leads to a less informative performance signal. Under limited liability, the principal may optimally react by increasing the weight on the signal and, hence, choosing higher-powered incentives. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Graduate School of Economics Bonn | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Bonn econ discussion papers 2008,6 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D82 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D86 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | moral hazard | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | limited liability | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | risk-incentive relationship | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Moral Hazard | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Beschränkte Haftung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Leistungsanreiz | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Risikoaversion | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Agency Theory | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Limited liability and the risk-incentive relationship | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 587680504 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn
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