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dc.contributor.authorNafziger, Juliaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-12-10en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-06T12:40:57Z-
dc.date.available2009-08-06T12:40:57Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/27166-
dc.description.abstractThis paper considers the interplay of job assignments with the intrinsic and extrinsic motivation of an agent. Job assignments influence the self confidence of the agent, and thereby his intrinsic motivation. Monetary reward allow the principal to complement intrinsic motivation with extrinsic incentives. The main result is that the principal chooses an inefficient job assignment rule to enhance the agent's intrinsic motivation even though she can motivate him with monetary rewards. This shows that, in the presence of intrinsically motivated agents, it is not possible to separate job assignment decisions from incentive provision.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherGraduate School of Economics Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesBonn econ discussion papers 2008,5en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelJ31en_US
dc.subject.jelJ33en_US
dc.subject.jelM12en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordIntrinsic and Extrinsic Motivationen_US
dc.subject.keywordJob Assignmentsen_US
dc.subject.stwAnforderungsprofilen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsmotivationen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsanreizen_US
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleJob assignments, intrinsic motivation and explicit incentivesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn587680164en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn

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