Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/27166 
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dc.contributor.authorNafziger, Juliaen
dc.date.accessioned2008-12-10-
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-06T12:40:57Z-
dc.date.available2009-08-06T12:40:57Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/27166-
dc.description.abstractThis paper considers the interplay of job assignments with the intrinsic and extrinsic motivation of an agent. Job assignments influence the self confidence of the agent, and thereby his intrinsic motivation. Monetary reward allow the principal to complement intrinsic motivation with extrinsic incentives. The main result is that the principal chooses an inefficient job assignment rule to enhance the agent's intrinsic motivation even though she can motivate him with monetary rewards. This shows that, in the presence of intrinsically motivated agents, it is not possible to separate job assignment decisions from incentive provision.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn Econ Discussion Papers |x5/2008en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelJ31en
dc.subject.jelJ33en
dc.subject.jelM12en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordIntrinsic and Extrinsic Motivationen
dc.subject.keywordJob Assignmentsen
dc.subject.stwAnforderungsprofilen
dc.subject.stwLeistungsmotivationen
dc.subject.stwLeistungsanreizen
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleJob Assignments, Intrinsic Motivation and Explicit Incentives-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn587680164en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:bonedp:52008-

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