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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/27166
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| Title: | | Job assignments, intrinsic motivation and explicit incentives  |
| Authors: | | Nafziger, Julia |
| Issue Date: | | 2008 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Bonn econ discussion papers 2008,5 |
| Abstract: | | This paper considers the interplay of job assignments with the intrinsic and extrinsic motivation of an agent. Job assignments influence the self confidence of the agent, and thereby his intrinsic motivation. Monetary reward allow the principal to complement intrinsic motivation with extrinsic incentives. The main result is that the principal chooses an inefficient job assignment rule to enhance the agent's intrinsic motivation even though she can motivate him with monetary rewards. This shows that, in the presence of intrinsically motivated agents, it is not possible to separate job assignment decisions from incentive provision. |
| Subjects: | | Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation Job Assignments |
| JEL: | | D82 J31 J33 M12 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn
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