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dc.contributor.authorStremitzer, Alexanderen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-01-23en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-06T12:40:54Z-
dc.date.available2009-08-06T12:40:54Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/27163-
dc.description.abstractWe consider a model of a single defendant and N plaintiffs where the total cost of litigation is fixed on the part of the plaintiffs and shared among the members of a suing coalition. By settling and dropping out of the coalition, a plaintiff therefore creates a negative externality on the other plaintiffs. It was shown in Che and Spier (2007) that failure to internalize this externality can often be exploited by the defendant. However, if plaintiffs make sequential take-it-or-leave-it settlement offers, we can show that they will actually be exploited by one of their fellow plaintiffs rather than by the defendant. Moreover, if litigation is a public good as is the case in shareholder derivative suits, parties may fail to reach a settlement even having complete information. This may explain why we observe derivative suits in the US but not in Europe.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherGraduate School of Economics Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesBonn econ discussion papers 2008,2en_US
dc.subject.jelK41en_US
dc.subject.jelC7en_US
dc.subject.jelH4en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordlitigationen_US
dc.subject.keywordsettlementen_US
dc.subject.keywordbargainingen_US
dc.subject.keywordcontracting with externalitiesen_US
dc.subject.keywordderivative suitsen_US
dc.subject.keywordpublic goodsen_US
dc.subject.stwZivilprozessen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwVertragstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwExterner Effekten_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titlePlaintiffs exploiting plaintiffsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn557268397en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn

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