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dc.contributor.authorSureth, Carenen_US
dc.contributor.authorMaiterth, Ralfen_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-02-16en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-06T11:06:02Z-
dc.date.available2009-08-06T11:06:02Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/27034-
dc.description.abstractAn alternative minimum tax (AMT) is often regarded as desirable. We analyze a wealth tax at corporate and personal level that is designed as an AMT as proposed by the German Green Party. This wealth tax is imputable to profit taxes and is hence intended to prevent multiple (multistage) taxation. Referring to data from annual reports and the German Central Bank we model enterprises of different structure, industry, size and legal status. We show that companies in the service sector which generally maintain rather high gearing rates are more frequently subjected to the wealth tax than capital intensive industries. This result runs counter to well-known effects of a common wealth tax. Capital intensive firms, e.g. in the metal industry, are levied with definitive wealth tax only if they have large loss carry-forwards or extremely volatile profits. Furthermore, partnerships often enjoy wealth tax privileges due to uniform taxation at individual level whereas corporations may suffer from the wealth tax at corporate and personal level caused by imputation backlogs. Obviously, the underlying AMT influences corporate dividend policy evoking a push-out effect. We prove that this kind of wealth taxation usually favors financial rather than real investment and encourages outbound investment. Consequently, introducing an AMT discriminates against many firms and investment projects, especially if economic income is lower than taxable income. This proves that whenever income is taxed correctly, AMT is dispensable.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherArbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre (arqus) [S.l.]de
dc.relation.ispartofseriesArqus-Diskussionsbeiträge zur quantitativen Steuerlehre 3de
dc.subject.jelH25en_US
dc.subject.jelH21en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordalternative minimum taxen_US
dc.subject.keywordbusiness strategyen_US
dc.subject.keywordinvestment decisionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordwealth taxen_US
dc.subject.stwVermögensteuerde
dc.subject.stwUnternehmensbesteuerungde
dc.subject.stwSteuerwirkungde
dc.subject.stwBetriebliche Investitionspolitikde
dc.subject.stwKapitalintensitätde
dc.subject.stwDeutschlandde
dc.titleWealth tax as alternative minimum tax? The impact of a wealth tax on business structure and strategyen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn507631021en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:arqudp:3-
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