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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/27000
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| Title: | | Can a preferential trade agreement benefit neighbor countries without compensating them?  |
| Authors: | | Endoh, Masahiro Hamada, Koichi Shimomura, Koji |
| Issue Date: | | 2008 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Center discussion paper // Economic Growth Center 961 |
| Abstract: | | PTAs are generally negotiated without any tariff concessions or transfers to non-member countries. Can such a PTA benefit the neighbors' welfare? In a two-good competitive equilibrium model in the absence of an entrepôt, a PTA without concessions to the outside will hurt the outsider's welfare when goods are normal. If one of the member countries is an entrepôt, however, it definitely improves the neighbors' welfare. In a multiple-good model, a PTA without concessions deteriorates the neighbors' welfare, provided that all the goods are normal and substitutes, and that initial tariff levels are small. |
| Subjects: | | PTA neighbor's welfare Kemp-Wan theorem WTO GATT article 24 Entrepôt |
| JEL: | | F11 F13 F15 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Center Discussion Papers, Economic Growth Center (EGC), Yale University
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