EconStor >
Yale University >
Economic Growth Center (EGC), Yale University >
Center Discussion Papers, Economic Growth Center (EGC), Yale University >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/27000
  
Title:Can a preferential trade agreement benefit neighbor countries without compensating them? PDF Logo
Authors:Endoh, Masahiro
Hamada, Koichi
Shimomura, Koji
Issue Date:2008
Series/Report no.:Center discussion paper // Economic Growth Center 961
Abstract:PTAs are generally negotiated without any tariff concessions or transfers to non-member countries. Can such a PTA benefit the neighbors' welfare? In a two-good competitive equilibrium model in the absence of an entrepôt, a PTA without concessions to the outside will hurt the outsider's welfare when goods are normal. If one of the member countries is an entrepôt, however, it definitely improves the neighbors' welfare. In a multiple-good model, a PTA without concessions deteriorates the neighbors' welfare, provided that all the goods are normal and substitutes, and that initial tariff levels are small.
Subjects:PTA
neighbor's welfare
Kemp-Wan theorem
WTO
GATT article 24
Entrepôt
JEL:F11
F13
F15
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Center Discussion Papers, Economic Growth Center (EGC), Yale University

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
593377702.PDF679.51 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/27000

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.