Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26978
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dc.contributor.authorEngel, Eduardo M. R. A.en_US
dc.contributor.authorFischer, Ronald D.en_US
dc.contributor.authorGaletovic, Alexanderen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-06T09:44:26Z-
dc.date.available2009-08-06T09:44:26Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26978-
dc.description.abstractInfrastructure concessions are frequently renegotiated after investments are sunk, resulting in better contractual terms for the franchise holders. This paper offers a political economy explanation for renegotiations that occur with no apparent holdup. We argue that they are used by political incumbents to anticipate infrastructure spending and thereby increase the probability of winning an upcoming election. Contract renegotiations allow administrations to replicate the effects of issuing debt. Yet debt issues are incorporated in the budget, must be approved by Congress and are therefore subject to the opposition’s review. By contrast, under current accounting standards the obligations created by renegotiations circumvent the budgetary process in most countries. Hence, renegotiations allow incumbents to spend more without being subject to Congressional oversight.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aYale Univ., Economic Growth Center|cNew Haven, Conn.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCenter discussion paper // Economic Growth Center|x937en_US
dc.subject.jelH21en_US
dc.subject.jelL51en_US
dc.subject.jelL91en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordbuild-operate-and-transfer (BOT)en_US
dc.subject.keywordconcessionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordrenegotiationen_US
dc.subject.keywordpublic-private partnershipsen_US
dc.titleRenegotiation without holdup: anticipating spending and infrastructure concessionsen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn593238648en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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