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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26978
  
Title:Renegotiation without holdup: anticipating spending and infrastructure concessions PDF Logo
Authors:Engel, Eduardo M. R. A.
Fischer, Ronald D.
Galetovic, Alexander
Issue Date:2006
Series/Report no.:Center discussion paper // Economic Growth Center 937
Abstract:Infrastructure concessions are frequently renegotiated after investments are sunk, resulting in better contractual terms for the franchise holders. This paper offers a political economy explanation for renegotiations that occur with no apparent holdup. We argue that they are used by political incumbents to anticipate infrastructure spending and thereby increase the probability of winning an upcoming election. Contract renegotiations allow administrations to replicate the effects of issuing debt. Yet debt issues are incorporated in the budget, must be approved by Congress and are therefore subject to the opposition’s review. By contrast, under current accounting standards the obligations created by renegotiations circumvent the budgetary process in most countries. Hence, renegotiations allow incumbents to spend more without being subject to Congressional oversight.
Subjects:build-operate-and-transfer (BOT)
concessions
renegotiation
public-private partnerships
JEL:H21
L51
L91
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Center Discussion Papers, Economic Growth Center (EGC), Yale University

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