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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Center Discussion Paper No. 929
Verlag: 
Yale University, Economic Growth Center, New Haven, CT
Zusammenfassung: 
We examine the impact of ambiguous and contested land rights on investment and productivity in agricultural in Akwapim, Ghana. We show that individuals who hold powerful positions in a local political hierarchy have more secure tenure rights, and that as a consequence they invest more in land fertility and have substantially higher output. The intensity of investments on different plots cultivated by a given individual correspond to that individual’s security of tenure over those specific plots, and in turn to the individual`s position in the political hierarchy relevant to those specific plots. We interpret these results in the context of a simple model of the political allocation of land rights in local matrilineages.
Schlagwörter: 
Land tenure
investment
institutions
JEL: 
O12
O13
O17
P48
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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