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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26970
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| Title: | | The profits of power: land rights and agricultural investment in Ghana  |
| Authors: | | Goldstein, Markus Udry, Christopher |
| Issue Date: | | 2005 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Center discussion paper // Economic Growth Center 929 |
| Abstract: | | We examine the impact of ambiguous and contested land rights on investment and productivity in agricultural in Akwapim, Ghana. We show that individuals who hold powerful positions in a local political hierarchy have more secure tenure rights, and that as a consequence they invest more in land fertility and have substantially higher output. The intensity of investments on different plots cultivated by a given individual correspond to that individual’s security of tenure over those specific plots, and in turn to the individual`s position in the political hierarchy relevant to those specific plots. We interpret these results in the context of a simple model of the political allocation of land rights in local matrilineages. |
| Subjects: | | Land tenure investment institutions |
| JEL: | | O12 O13 O17 P48 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Center Discussion Papers, Economic Growth Center (EGC), Yale University
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