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Title:The profits of power: land rights and agricultural investment in Ghana PDF Logo
Authors:Goldstein, Markus
Udry, Christopher
Issue Date:2005
Series/Report no.:Center discussion paper // Economic Growth Center 929
Abstract:We examine the impact of ambiguous and contested land rights on investment and productivity in agricultural in Akwapim, Ghana. We show that individuals who hold powerful positions in a local political hierarchy have more secure tenure rights, and that as a consequence they invest more in land fertility and have substantially higher output. The intensity of investments on different plots cultivated by a given individual correspond to that individual’s security of tenure over those specific plots, and in turn to the individual`s position in the political hierarchy relevant to those specific plots. We interpret these results in the context of a simple model of the political allocation of land rights in local matrilineages.
Subjects:Land tenure
investment
institutions
JEL:O12
O13
O17
P48
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Center Discussion Papers, Economic Growth Center (EGC), Yale University

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