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dc.contributor.authorNicklisch, Andreasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-07-23en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-06T09:28:16Z-
dc.date.available2009-08-06T09:28:16Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26961-
dc.description.abstractThis article reports the results of a simple bargaining experiment on the ultimatum-revenge game. The game enables to differentiate between fairness that is stimulated by intentional based motives, distributional motives, and fairness considerations that mix both motives. The laboratory experiments indicate considerable heterogeneity of motives. A majority of subjects seem to combine both motives. However, the composition of the mix is subject to a transition, which can be formalized by the principle of appropriateness. In contrast to contemporary reciprocity models, this approach suggests that mildly unkind treatments are responded mildly unkindly, while strong unkindness leads to harsh reactions.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008,24en_US
dc.subject.jelD63en_US
dc.subject.jelD64en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keyworddistributional preferencesen_US
dc.subject.keywordfairnessen_US
dc.subject.keywordintentional based preferencesen_US
dc.subject.keywordsocial welfareen_US
dc.subject.keywordultimatum bargainingen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwVerteilungsgerechtigkeiten_US
dc.subject.stwReziprozit├Ąten_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleInequity aversion, reciprocity, and appropriateness in the ultimatum-revenge gameen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn572388799en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
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