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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods No. 2008,24
Verlag: 
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
This article reports the results of a simple bargaining experiment on the ultimatum-revenge game. The game enables to differentiate between fairness that is stimulated by intentional based motives, distributional motives, and fairness considerations that mix both motives. The laboratory experiments indicate considerable heterogeneity of motives. A majority of subjects seem to combine both motives. However, the composition of the mix is subject to a transition, which can be formalized by the principle of appropriateness. In contrast to contemporary reciprocity models, this approach suggests that mildly unkind treatments are responded mildly unkindly, while strong unkindness leads to harsh reactions.
Schlagwörter: 
distributional preferences
fairness
intentional based preferences
social welfare
ultimatum bargaining
JEL: 
D63
D64
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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