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dc.contributor.authorCrivelli, Ernestoen_US
dc.contributor.authorStaal, Klaasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-07-23en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-06T09:28:11Z-
dc.date.available2009-08-06T09:28:11Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26954-
dc.description.abstractThere is much evidence against the so-called too big to fail hypothesis in the case of bailouts to subnational governments. We look at a model where districts of different size provide local public goods with positive spillovers. Matching grants of a central government can induce so-cially-efficient provision, but districts can still exploit the intervening central government by induc-ing direct financing. We show that the ability and willingness of a district to induce a bailout and district size are negatively correlated. We also discuss the effect economies of scale in local public goods provision has on the bailout policies and argue that these policies can be subgame perfect equilibrium strategies.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008,17en_US
dc.subject.jelH4en_US
dc.subject.jelH7en_US
dc.subject.jelR1en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordbailoutsen_US
dc.subject.keywordsoft-budget constraintsen_US
dc.subject.keyworddistrict sizeen_US
dc.subject.keywordspilloversen_US
dc.subject.stwGemeindefinanzenen_US
dc.subject.stwGroßstadten_US
dc.subject.stwBudgetrestriktionen_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzausgleichen_US
dc.subject.stwLokales öffentliches Guten_US
dc.subject.stwSpillover-Effekten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleSize, spillovers and soft budget constraintsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn572378505en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
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