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dc.contributor.authorBurhop, Carstenen_US
dc.contributor.authorLübbers, Thorstenen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-07-22en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-06T09:28:08Z-
dc.date.available2009-08-06T09:28:08Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26950-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we evaluate the impact of cartelisation and managerial incentives on the productive efficiency of German coal mining corporations. We focus on coal mining in the Ruhr district, Germany’s main mining area. We use stochastic frontier analysis and an unbalanced dynamic panel data set for up to 28 firms for the years 1881-1913 to measure productive efficiency. We show that coal was mined with decreasing returns to scale. Moreover, it turns out that cartelisation did not affect productive efficiency. Controlling for corporate governance variables shows that stronger managerial incentives were significantly correlated with productive efficiency, whereas the debt-equity ratio did not influence it.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008,13en_US
dc.subject.jelN53en_US
dc.subject.jelL41en_US
dc.subject.jelL71en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordEconomic historyen_US
dc.subject.keywordGermany pre-1913en_US
dc.subject.keywordCartelen_US
dc.subject.keywordProductive efficiencyen_US
dc.subject.keywordCorporate Governanceen_US
dc.subject.stwCorporate Governanceen_US
dc.subject.stwFührungskräfteen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsorientierte Vergütungen_US
dc.subject.stwKartellen_US
dc.subject.stwKohlenbergbauen_US
dc.subject.stwTechnische Effizienzen_US
dc.subject.stwGeschichteen_US
dc.subject.stwDeutschland (bis 1945)en_US
dc.titleCartels, managerial incentives, and productive efficiency in German coal mining, 1881-1913en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn572304366en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

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