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| Title: | | Optimal democratic mechanisms for taxation and public good provision  |
| Authors: | | Bierbrauer, Felix Sahm, Marco |
| Issue Date: | | 2008 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008,9 |
| Abstract: | | We study the interdependence of optimal tax and expenditure policies. An optimal policy requires that information on preferences is made available. We first study this problem from a general mechanism design perspective and show that efficiency is possible only if the individuals who decide on public good provision face an own incentive scheme that differs from the tax system. We then study democratic mechanisms with the property that tax payers vote over public goods. Under such a mechanism, efficiency cannot be reached and welfare from public good provision declines as the inequality between rich and poor individuals increases. |
| Subjects: | | Public goods optimal taxation two-dimensional heterogeneity asymmetric information |
| JEL: | | H41 D71 D72 D82 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
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