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| Title: | | The (de)composition of firms: interdependent preferences of corporate actors  |
| Authors: | | Nicklisch, Andreas |
| Issue Date: | | 2007 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2007,21 |
| Abstract: | | This article discusses the limitations of the orthodox economic theory of the firm as a nexus of contracts. Various experimental studies have shown that the aggregation of individuals in groups changes behavior and preferences systematically. This perspective has been formalized by models of interdependent preferences. Based on a prominent approach of interdependent preferences, intention-based preferences, two types of labor contracts, incentive contracts and bonus contracts, are analyzed. Results are compared with the predictions of the orthodox economic theory. |
| Subjects: | | Firms interdependent preferences labor contracts |
| JEL: | | D21 D63 L14 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
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