|
EconStor >
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn >
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26931
|
| | |
Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Höffler, Felix | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Schmidt, Klaus M. | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2007-12-12 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-08-06T09:27:53Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2009-08-06T09:27:53Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2007 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26931 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | In some markets vertically integrated firms sell directly to final customers but also to independent downstream firms with whom they then compete on the downstream market. It is often argued that resellers intensify competition and benefit consumers, in particular when wholesale prices are regulated. However, we show that (i) resale may increase prices and make consumers worse off and that (ii) standard retail minus X regulation may increase prices and harm consumers. Our analysis suggests that this is more likely if the number of integrated firms is small, the degree of product differentiation is low, and/or if competition is spatial. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Max Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Bonn | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2007,16 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D43 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | L11 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | L42 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | L51 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Resale regulation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | wholesale | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | spatial product differentiation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | non-spatial product | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Verkauf | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Verbraucher | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Vorprodukt | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Preisbindung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Konsumentenrente | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Two tales on resale | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 551651792 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|