Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26931
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods No. 2007,16
Publisher: 
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn
Abstract: 
In some markets vertically integrated firms sell directly to final customers but also to independent downstream firms with whom they then compete on the downstream market. It is often argued that resellers intensify competition and benefit consumers, in particular when wholesale prices are regulated. However, we show that (i) resale may increase prices and make consumers worse off and that (ii) standard retail minus X regulation may increase prices and harm consumers. Our analysis suggests that this is more likely if the number of integrated firms is small, the degree of product differentiation is low, and/or if competition is spatial.
Subjects: 
Resale regulation
wholesale
spatial product differentiation
non-spatial product
JEL: 
D43
L11
L42
L51
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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