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dc.contributor.authorBechtold, Stefanen_US
dc.contributor.authorHöffler, Felixen_US
dc.date.accessioned2007-12-12en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-06T09:27:52Z-
dc.date.available2009-08-06T09:27:52Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26929-
dc.description.abstractThe economic analysis of trade-secret protection has traditionally focused on the interests of companies to conceal information from competitors in order to gain competitive advantage through trade-secret law. This has neglected cases in which the interest is not in concealing information from competi- tors, but from trading partners. We investigate the social e¢ ciency e¤ects of trade-secret protection in such cases. Many results from economic theory state that asymmetric information (and therefore also its legal protection) is socially undesirable since it leads to ine¢ cient trade. At the same time, protecting private information might create incentives for socially desirable investments. We model this trade-o¤ in a simple buyer-seller model and …nd that, indeed, trade-secret protection has ambiguous welfare e¤ects. However, a simple, informationally undemanding rule, conditioning the applicability of legal protection on a minimum investment by the informed party to conceal the information, helps to apply trade-secret protection only when it increases welfare. This rationalizes important features of current legal practice, but sug- gests that the e¤ort to conceal rather than the e¤ort to reveal the information should play a role when deciding whether or not trade secret protection should be granted.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2007,18en_US
dc.subject.jelK2en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keyworddisclosure of informationen_US
dc.subject.keywordhold-up problemsen_US
dc.subject.keywordtrade secretsen_US
dc.subject.stwGeschäftsgeheimnisen_US
dc.subject.stwLieferanten-Kunden-Beziehungen_US
dc.subject.stwInformationsverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleAn economic analysis of trade-secret protection in buyer-seller relationshipsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn551634014en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

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