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dc.contributor.authorJansen, Josen_US
dc.date.accessioned2007-12-12en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-06T09:27:51Z-
dc.date.available2009-08-06T09:27:51Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26928-
dc.description.abstractI study the incentives of oligopolists to acquire and disclose information on a common demand intercept. Since firms may fail to acquire information even when they invest in information acquisition, firms can credibly conceal unfavorable news while disclosing favorable news. Firms may earn higher expected profits under such a selective disclosure regime than under the regimes where firms commit to share all or no information. In particular, this holds under both Cournot and Bertrand competition, if the firms have sufficiently flat information acquisition cost functions. For steeper cost functions Cournot duopolists prefer strategic disclosure, if their goods are sufficiently differentiated.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2007,13en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelD83en_US
dc.subject.jelL13en_US
dc.subject.jelL40en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordoligopolistic competitionen_US
dc.subject.keywordinformation acquisitionen_US
dc.subject.keywordinformation sharingen_US
dc.subject.keywordcommitmenten_US
dc.subject.keywordcommon valueen_US
dc.subject.keywordproduct differentiationen_US
dc.subject.stwInformationsverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwInformationsaustauschen_US
dc.subject.stwOligopolen_US
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwProduktdifferenzierungen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleInformation acquisition and strategic disclosure in oligopolyen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn551625511en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
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