|
EconStor >
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn >
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26918
|
| | |
| Title: | | Incentives for process innovation in a collusive duopoly  |
| Authors: | | Engel, Christoph |
| Issue Date: | | 2007 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2007,6 |
| Abstract: | | Two suppliers of a homogenous good know that, in the second period, they will be able to collude. Gains from collusion are split according to the Nash bargaining solution. In the first period, either of them is able to invest into process innovation. Innovation changes the status quo pay-off, and thereby affects the distribution of the gains from collusion. The resulting innovation incentive is strictly smaller than in the competitive case. |
| Subjects: | | Duopoly Collusion Innovation Incentives |
| JEL: | | D43 K21 L13 O31 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
|
| Files in This Item:
| |
|
| No. of Downloads:
| |
| last Month |
last 3 Month |
total |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26918
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|