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dc.contributor.authorHellwig, Martinen_US
dc.description.abstractThe paper develops a technique for studying incentive problems with unidimensional hidden characteristics. The technique supports a unified approach, which can be applied regardless of whether the type set is finite, the type distribution has a continuous density, or the type distribution has both, mass points and an atomless part. The proposition that optimal incentive schemes induce no distortion at the top and downward distortions below the top is confirmed for arbitrary type distributions. However, mass points are pooled with immediately neighbouring higher types. Between a mass point and immediately neighbouring lower types, there may have to be a discontinuity.en_US
dc.publisherMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006,26en_US
dc.subject.keywordHidden Characteristicsen_US
dc.subject.keywordwith General Type Distributionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordPrincipal-Agent Problemen_US
dc.subject.keywordIncentive Schemesen_US
dc.titleIncentive provision with hidden characteristics: A unified approachen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

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