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|Title:||Cooperation in symmetric and asymmetric prisoner's dilemma games |
Maier-Rigaud, Frank P.
|Issue Date:||2006 |
|Series/Report no.:||Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006,25|
|Abstract:||We experimentally study the effect of asymmetry on cooperation in a 40 period prisoner's dilemma game in fixed partner design. We distinguish between a high and low payoff symmetric prisoner's dilemma and an asymmetric game combined out of both symmetric ones. Asymmetry significantly decreases cooperation, as low-type players are more likely to defect after mutual cooperation while high-type players initiate cooperation more often than the former. Asymmetry also has a significant negative effect on the stability of cooperation rendering long sequences of mutual cooperation extremely rare.|
|Document Type:||Working Paper|
|Appears in Collections:||Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods|
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