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| Title: | | The provision and pricing of excludable public goods: Ramsey-Boiteux Pricing versus bundling  |
| Authors: | | Hellwig, Martin |
| Issue Date: | | 2006 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006,21 |
| Abstract: | | This paper studies the relation between Bayesian mechanism de- sign and the Ramsey-Boiteux approach to the provision and pricing of excludable public goods. For a large economy with private informa- tion about individual preferences, the two approaches are shown to be equivalent if and only if, in addition to incentive compatibility and par- ticipation constraints, the
nal allocation of private-good consumption and admission tickets to public goods satis
es a condition of renegoti- ation proofness. Without this condition, a mechanism involving mixed bundling, i.e. combination tickets at a discount, is superior. |
| Subjects: | | Mechanism Design Excludable Public Goods Ramsey- Boiteux Pricing Renegotiation Proofness Bundling |
| JEL: | | D61 H21 H41 H42 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
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