Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26905
Authors: 
Hellwig, Martin
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006,21
Abstract: 
This paper studies the relation between Bayesian mechanism de- sign and the Ramsey-Boiteux approach to the provision and pricing of excludable public goods. For a large economy with private informa- tion about individual preferences, the two approaches are shown to be equivalent if and only if, in addition to incentive compatibility and par- ticipation constraints, the …nal allocation of private-good consumption and admission tickets to public goods satis…es a condition of renegoti- ation proofness. Without this condition, a mechanism involving mixed bundling, i.e. combination tickets at a discount, is superior.
Subjects: 
Mechanism Design
Excludable Public Goods
Ramsey- Boiteux Pricing
Renegotiation Proofness
Bundling
JEL: 
D61
H21
H41
H42
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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