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dc.contributor.authorBierbrauer, Felixen_US
dc.contributor.authorSahm, Marcoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-12-13en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-06T09:27:32Z-
dc.date.available2009-08-06T09:27:32Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26902-
dc.description.abstractWe study the classical free-rider problem in public goods provision in a large economy with uncertainty about the average valuation of the public good. Individual preferences over public goods are shaped by a skill and a taste parameter. We use a mechanism design approach to solve for the optimal utilitarian provision rule. The relevant incentive constraints for information aggregation ensure that individuals behave as if they were engaging in informative voting over the level of public good provision. It is shown that the use of information by an optimal provision rule is inversely related to the polarization of preferences which results from the properties of the skill distribution.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006,18en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.jelD71en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordinformation aggregationen_US
dc.subject.keywordinformative votingen_US
dc.subject.keywordpublic goodsen_US
dc.subject.keywordtwo-dimensional heterogeneityen_US
dc.subject.stwInformationsverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten_US
dc.subject.stwTrittbrettfahrerverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleInformative voting and the Samuelson ruleen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn521158613en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

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