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dc.contributor.authorNicklisch, Andreasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-12-13en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-06T09:27:31Z-
dc.date.available2009-08-06T09:27:31Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26901-
dc.description.abstractWe present the results of an experiment on learning with minimal information. Particularly, subjects are only provided with feedback about their own payoff from the last period of the game being played, but not with information about the structure of the game. We compare the empirical structure of the decision algorithm for this setting with the empirical structure of algorithms for subjects who receive sufficient information to learn the game. The laboratory data show that, depending on the information setting, players adjust their strategy choice differently. The structure of the decision algorithm for subjects operating with minimal information indicates myopic responses to success, while the structure for sufficiently informed players is more complex. As a consequence, sufficiently informed players outperform players who have minimal information in a simple coordination game. Yet, if the structure of the game changes, readjustment is more successful for the players operating with minimal information.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006,17en_US
dc.subject.jelD83en_US
dc.subject.jelD84en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordExperimental economicsen_US
dc.subject.keywordlearningen_US
dc.subject.keywordminimal social situationen_US
dc.subject.keywordmyopiaen_US
dc.titlePerceiving strategic environments: an experimental study of learning under minimal informationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn521158443en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
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