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dc.contributor.authorHöffler, Felixen_US
dc.contributor.authorWittmann, Tobiasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-05-23en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-06T09:27:22Z-
dc.date.available2009-08-06T09:27:22Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26889-
dc.description.abstractScarce interconnector capacities are a severe obstacle to transregional competition and a unified market for electricity in the European Union. However, physically the interconnectors are rarely used up to capacity. This is due to the fact that the current allocation schemes make only limited use of the fact that currents in opposing directions cancel out. We propose a netting auction mechanism which makes use of this and in which even small transmission capacities can generate large competitive pressure in adjacent markets. Netting increases the usage of capacity and reduces the auctioneer's incentive to withhold capacity from the auction.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006,5en_US
dc.subject.jelL94en_US
dc.subject.jelD44en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordDivisible good auctionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordinterconnectoren_US
dc.subject.keywordelectricity marktesen_US
dc.subject.keywordcompetition policyen_US
dc.subject.stwStromnetzen_US
dc.subject.stwKapazitätsauslastungen_US
dc.subject.stwAuktionen_US
dc.subject.stwElektrizitäten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwEU-Staatenen_US
dc.titleNetting of capacity in interconnector auctionsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn512217033en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
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