|
EconStor >
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn >
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26878
|
| | |
| Title: | | Optimal income taxation and public good provision in a two-class economy  |
| Authors: | | Bierbrauer, Felix |
| Issue Date: | | 2005 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2005,25 |
| Abstract: | | This paper combines the problem of optimal income taxation with the free-rider problem in public good provision. There are two groups of individuals with private information on their earning ability and their valuation of a public good. Adjustments of the transfer system are needed to discourage the more productive from exaggerating the desirability of public good provision. Similarly, the less productive need to be prevented from understating their valuation. Relative to an optimal income tax, which focuses solely on earning ability, income transfers are increased whenever a public good is installed and are decreased otherwise. |
| Subjects: | | Income Taxation Public Good Provision Revelation of Preferences Two-dimensional Heterogeneity |
| JEL: | | D71 D82 H21 H41 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26878
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|