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Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn >
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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26866
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Gaube, Thomas | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2005-05-02 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-08-06T09:27:05Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2009-08-06T09:27:05Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2005 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26866 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | This paper deals with second-best pollution taxation by investigating allocations instead of the corresponding tax rates. Assuming certain restrictions on utility and that the marginal revenue from environmental taxation is positive, it is shown that environmental quality is higher in second best where only distortionary taxes are used to finance public expenditures than in the first-best optimum where lump-sum taxes are available. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Max Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Bonn | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2005,9 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H21 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H41 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | environmental taxation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | public goods | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Ökosteuer | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Umweltbelastung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Second Best | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Steuerwirkung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Second-best pollution taxation and environmental quality | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 485073072 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
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