Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26866
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dc.contributor.authorGaube, Thomasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2005-05-02en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-06T09:27:05Z-
dc.date.available2009-08-06T09:27:05Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26866-
dc.description.abstractThis paper deals with second-best pollution taxation by investigating allocations instead of the corresponding tax rates. Assuming certain restrictions on utility and that the marginal revenue from environmental taxation is positive, it is shown that environmental quality is higher in second best where only distortionary taxes are used to finance public expenditures than in the first-best optimum where lump-sum taxes are available.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods|cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods|x2005,9en_US
dc.subject.jelH21en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordenvironmental taxationen_US
dc.subject.keywordpublic goodsen_US
dc.subject.stwÖkosteueren_US
dc.subject.stwUmweltbelastungen_US
dc.subject.stwSecond Besten_US
dc.subject.stwSteuerwirkungen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleSecond-best pollution taxation and environmental qualityen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn485073072en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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