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Title:Second-best pollution taxation and environmental quality PDF Logo
Authors:Gaube, Thomas
Issue Date:2005
Series/Report no.:Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2005,9
Abstract:This paper deals with second-best pollution taxation by investigating allocations instead of the corresponding tax rates. Assuming certain restrictions on utility and that the marginal revenue from environmental taxation is positive, it is shown that environmental quality is higher in second best where only distortionary taxes are used to finance public expenditures than in the first-best optimum where lump-sum taxes are available.
Subjects:environmental taxation
public goods
JEL:H21
H41
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

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