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Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI), Essen >
Ruhr Economic Papers, RWI >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26842
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| Title: | | Do optional deductibles reduce the number of doctor visits?: empirical evidence with German dat  |
| Authors: | | Schmitz, Hendrik |
| Issue Date: | | 2008 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Ruhr economic papers 76 |
| Abstract: | | Deductibles in health insurance are often regarded as a means to contain health care costs when individuals exhibit moral hazard. However, in the absence of moral hazard, voluntarily chosen deductibles may instead lead to self-selection into different insurance contracts. We use a set of new variables in the German Socioeconomic Panel for the years 2002, 2004, and 2006 that measure individual health more accurately and include risk-attitudes towards health in order to determine the price elasticity of demand for health care. A latent class approach that takes into account the panel structure of the data reveals that the effect of deductibles on the number of doctor visits is negligible. Private add-on insurance increases the number of doctor visits. However, altogether the effects of the insurance state on the demand for doctor visits are small in magnitude. |
| Subjects: | | Health insurance deductibles add-on insurance count data latent class panel model |
| JEL: | | I11 I18 G22 |
| ISBN: | | 978-3-86788-081-7 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des RWI Ruhr Economic Papers, RWI
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