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Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI), Essen >
Ruhr Economic Papers, RWI >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26781
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Konrad, Kai A. | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Leininger, Wolfgang | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2007-07-02 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-08-06T09:01:46Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2009-08-06T09:01:46Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2007 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.isbn | | 978-3-86788-010-7 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26781 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | We study how norms can solve distributional conflict inside a clan and the efficient coordination of collective action in a conflict with an external enemy.We characterize a fully non-cooperative equilibrium in a finite game in which a self-enforcing norm coordinates the members on efficient collective action and on a peaceful distribution of the returns of collective action. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | RWI Essen | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Ruhr economic papers 16 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D72 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D74 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H41 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Free-riding | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | defence | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | collective action | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | distributional conflict | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | war | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | norms | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Normbefolgung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Gemeinschaft | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Verteilungskonflikt | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Krieg | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Trittbrettfahrerverhalten | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Spieltheorie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Normbefolgung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Gemeinschaft | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Verteilungskonflikt | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Krieg | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Trittbrettfahrerverhalten | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Spieltheorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Self-enforcing norms and the efficient non-cooperative organization of clans | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 534694020 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des RWI Ruhr Economic Papers, RWI
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