Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26781
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dc.contributor.authorKonrad, Kai A.en_US
dc.contributor.authorLeininger, Wolfgangen_US
dc.date.accessioned2007-07-02en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-06T09:01:46Z-
dc.date.available2009-08-06T09:01:46Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.isbn978-3-86788-010-7en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26781-
dc.description.abstractWe study how norms can solve distributional conflict inside a clan and the efficient coordination of collective action in a conflict with an external enemy.We characterize a fully non-cooperative equilibrium in a finite game in which a self-enforcing norm coordinates the members on efficient collective action and on a peaceful distribution of the returns of collective action.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aRWI|cEssenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aRuhr economic papers|x16en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelD74en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordFree-ridingen_US
dc.subject.keyworddefenceen_US
dc.subject.keywordcollective actionen_US
dc.subject.keyworddistributional conflicten_US
dc.subject.keywordwaren_US
dc.subject.keywordnormsen_US
dc.subject.stwNormbefolgungen_US
dc.subject.stwGemeinschaften_US
dc.subject.stwVerteilungskonflikten_US
dc.subject.stwKriegen_US
dc.subject.stwTrittbrettfahrerverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwNormbefolgungen_US
dc.subject.stwGemeinschaften_US
dc.subject.stwVerteilungskonflikten_US
dc.subject.stwKriegen_US
dc.subject.stwTrittbrettfahrerverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.titleSelf-enforcing Norms and the Efficient Non-cooperative Organization of Clansen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn534694020en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:rwirep:16-

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