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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26781
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Konrad, Kai A. | en |
dc.contributor.author | Leininger, Wolfgang | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2007-07-02 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-08-06T09:01:46Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-08-06T09:01:46Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2007 | - |
dc.identifier.isbn | 978-3-86788-010-7 | en |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26781 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We study how norms can solve distributional conflict inside a clan and the efficient coordination of collective action in a conflict with an external enemy.We characterize a fully non-cooperative equilibrium in a finite game in which a self-enforcing norm coordinates the members on efficient collective action and on a peaceful distribution of the returns of collective action. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aRheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI) |cEssen | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aRuhr Economic Papers |x16 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D72 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D74 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H41 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Free-riding | en |
dc.subject.keyword | defence | en |
dc.subject.keyword | collective action | en |
dc.subject.keyword | distributional conflict | en |
dc.subject.keyword | war | en |
dc.subject.keyword | norms | en |
dc.subject.stw | Normbefolgung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Gemeinschaft | en |
dc.subject.stw | Verteilungskonflikt | en |
dc.subject.stw | Krieg | en |
dc.subject.stw | Trittbrettfahrerverhalten | en |
dc.subject.stw | Spieltheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Normbefolgung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Gemeinschaft | en |
dc.subject.stw | Verteilungskonflikt | en |
dc.subject.stw | Krieg | en |
dc.subject.stw | Trittbrettfahrerverhalten | en |
dc.subject.stw | Spieltheorie | en |
dc.title | Self-enforcing Norms and the Efficient Non-cooperative Organization of Clans | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 534694020 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:zbw:rwirep:16 | en |
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