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Title:Self-enforcing norms and the efficient non-cooperative organization of clans PDF Logo
Authors:Konrad, Kai A.
Leininger, Wolfgang
Issue Date:2007
Series/Report no.:Ruhr economic papers 16
Abstract:We study how norms can solve distributional conflict inside a clan and the efficient coordination of collective action in a conflict with an external enemy.We characterize a fully non-cooperative equilibrium in a finite game in which a self-enforcing norm coordinates the members on efficient collective action and on a peaceful distribution of the returns of collective action.
Subjects:Free-riding
defence
collective action
distributional conflict
war
norms
JEL:D72
D74
H41
ISBN:978-3-86788-010-7
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des RWI
Ruhr Economic Papers, RWI

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