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Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI), Essen >
Ruhr Economic Papers, RWI >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26781
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| Title: | | Self-enforcing norms and the efficient non-cooperative organization of clans  |
| Authors: | | Konrad, Kai A. Leininger, Wolfgang |
| Issue Date: | | 2007 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Ruhr economic papers 16 |
| Abstract: | | We study how norms can solve distributional conflict inside a clan and the efficient coordination of collective action in a conflict with an external enemy.We characterize a fully non-cooperative equilibrium in a finite game in which a self-enforcing norm coordinates the members on efficient collective action and on a peaceful distribution of the returns of collective action. |
| Subjects: | | Free-riding defence collective action distributional conflict war norms |
| JEL: | | D72 D74 H41 |
| ISBN: | | 978-3-86788-010-7 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des RWI Ruhr Economic Papers, RWI
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