Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26781
Authors: 
Konrad, Kai A.
Leininger, Wolfgang
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
Ruhr economic papers 16
Abstract: 
We study how norms can solve distributional conflict inside a clan and the efficient coordination of collective action in a conflict with an external enemy.We characterize a fully non-cooperative equilibrium in a finite game in which a self-enforcing norm coordinates the members on efficient collective action and on a peaceful distribution of the returns of collective action.
Subjects: 
Free-riding
defence
collective action
distributional conflict
war
norms
JEL: 
D72
D74
H41
ISBN: 
978-3-86788-010-7
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
233.93 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.