Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26774 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2007
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Ruhr Economic Papers No. 9
Verlag: 
Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI), Essen
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper offers a cartel explanation for the stability of German collective bargaining institutions.We show that a dense net of legal safeguards has been yarned around the wage setting cartel. These measures make deviation by cartel insiders less attractive and simultaneously erect entry barriers for alternative unions. As we argue many recent labor policy measures, which make wages more flexible, serve to further stabilize the labor cartel, while truly pro-competitive proposals have not been implemented exactly because of their destabilizing effects.We propose policy measures that remove entry barriers and facilitate outside competition by alternative collective bargaining organizations.
Schlagwörter: 
Labor market cartel
labor market institutions
collective bargaining
JEL: 
J52
K31
L12
ISBN: 
978-3-86788-001-5
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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