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Title:Asymmetric information renders minimum wages less harmful PDF Logo
Authors:Schöb, Ronnie
Thum, Marcel
Issue Date:2009
Series/Report no.:CESifo working paper 2623
Abstract:We show that a minimum wage introduced in the presence of asymmetric information about worker productivities will lead to lower unemployment levels than predicted by the standard labour market model with heterogeneous labour and symmetric information.
Subjects:minimum wages
unemployment
asymmetric information
labour market regulation
JEL:J2
J3
H5
L5
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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