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dc.contributor.authorGächter, Simonen_US
dc.contributor.authorNosenzo, Danieleen_US
dc.contributor.authorRenner, Elkeen_US
dc.contributor.authorSefton, Martinen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-04-20en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:49:23Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:49:23Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26647-
dc.description.abstractWe report an experiment comparing sequential and simultaneous contributions to a public good in a quasi-linear two-person setting (Varian, Journal of Public Economics, 1994). Our findings support the theoretical argument that sequential contributions result in lower overall provision than simultaneous contributions. However, the distribution of contributions is not as predicted: late contributors are sometimes willing to punish early low contributors by contributing less than their best response. This induces early contributors to contribute more than they otherwise would. A consequence of this is that we fail to observe a predicted first mover advantage.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2602en_US
dc.subject.jelC92en_US
dc.subject.jelD03en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordPublic goodsen_US
dc.subject.keywordvoluntary contributionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordsequential movesen_US
dc.subject.keywordexperimenten_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten_US
dc.subject.stwSpendeen_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleSequential versus simultaneous contributions to public goods: experimental evidenceen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn59782519Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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