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Title:Moderating political extremism: single round vs runoff elections under plurality rule PDF Logo
Authors:Bordignon, Massimo
Tabellini, Guido
Issue Date:2009
Series/Report no.:CESifo working paper 2600
Abstract:We compare single ballot vs dual ballot elections under plurality rule, assuming sincere voting and allowing for partly endogenous party formation. Under the dual ballot, the number of parties is larger but the influence of extremist voters on equilibrium policy is smaller, because their bargaining power is reduced compared to a single ballot election. The predictions on the number of parties and on policy volatility are consistent with data on municipal elections in Italy, where cities with more (less) than 15,000 inhabitants have dual (single) ballots respectively.
Subjects:Run-off
municipal elections
political bargaining
property
JEL:H71
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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